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INTRODUCTION

For Delaware, it is the best of times and the worst of
times. The institutional prestige of the Delaware Court of
Chancery has never been higher. Under the leadership of
Chancellors Allen, Chandler and Strine, the court has
converted many (and possibly most) of the academics, who
once tended to be skeptical of Delaware.2 Academics and
practitioners alike have been impressed by both the depth
and thoughtfulness of the court of chancery's decisions and
the hardworking style of its vice chancellors (who regularly
seem able to turn out lengthy decisions in days that would
take many federal circuit courts months and even years to
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law and Director of the Center on
Corporate Governance, Columbia University School of Law.
' Chancellor William T. Allen was appointed in 1985, and as Justice
Jack Jacobs points out in his contribution to this Symposium, it was a
turning point in the Court's long history. See Jack B. Jacobs, A Brief
History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 406,

409 (2012).

As Justice Jacobs correctly observes, the Supreme Court's

decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), gave the

Court of Chancery "the control of modern corporate law," but it was the
skill and eloquence of Chancellor Allen that produced a body of takeover
law that was subtle, balanced, and lasting.
2 See William Cary, Federalismand Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (concluding that Delaware had led a

"race to the bottom").
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complete). Corporate management and their counsel appear
equally satisfied, as the rules for various classes of
transactions (takeovers and leveraged buyouts in particular)
have been clarified. Plaintiffs' attorneys may grumble that
they seldom win in Delaware,' but they do settle cases there,
and settlements, not fully litigated victories, produce the
revenues that fuel the plaintiffs bar. In short, for most of
these constituencies, these are the best of times.
But, beginning sometime after 2000, a cloud appeared
over the happy skies of Delaware, and that cloud has now
grown into a storm.' The new crisis has two elements, which
interlock in a way that makes the problem relatively
intractable to judicial resolution:
First, cases are fleeing Delaware. For example, where
once over two thirds of M&A litigation involving Delaware
target companies was brought in the Delaware Court of
Chancery,6 this percentage dropped to thirty-four percent
between 2002 and 2010.' The Court of Chancery's declining
share of litigation involving Delaware-incorporated
corporations has an obvious meaning for the Delaware Bar:
they are losing business! More to the point, because the Bar
is a leading local industry in Delaware, this impact cannot be

' This pace is partly the product of the specialized jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery, whose docket is dominated by M&A cases in which
relief must normally be decided on a time-constrained basis before the
shareholder meeting.
' Plaintiff victories, however, do occur. See, e.g., In re S. Peru Copper
Corp. S'holder Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011) (awarding $1.9 billion in
stock against controlling shareholder as damages for an unfair "going
private" transaction).
' It is difficult to identify the precise date on which this cloud turned
into a storm, but a perception of a crisis can be dated back to 2007. See
Ted Mirvis, Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and
Suggests Some Solutions, 7 M&A J., 17, 18 (2007).
6 See Brian Cheffins, John Armour & Bernard Black, Delaware
Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs' Bar, 2012
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 427, 433 (2012).
7 Id.
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ignored for long by Delaware's judiciary.' Interest groups
sooner or later influence politically accountable bodies,
including even courts.
Second, the overall rate of stockholder litigation in state
courts is increasing sharply, particularly in the M&A field.?
Where once the percentage of Delaware target corporations
that were sued in M&A litigation was just under fifty
percent for all such Delaware transactions, 0 the percentage
of M&A transactions now attracting litigation has soared to
ninety percent or above in some recent years (both for
Delaware and non-Delaware corporations.)" Yet given that
the volume of federal securities litigation appears to be
steadily declining,12 this across-the-board growth in state
court litigation is in sharp contrast to, and cannot be
explained in terms of, any broad social theory of increased
litigiousness in American society. Something more specific
and limited is happening.
The relationship between these two elements is critical to
the understanding of the dilemma now facing Delaware. In
' See Jonathan H. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward An Interest
Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1987). For
the more specific claim that the Delaware judiciary has a strong incentive
to support the Delaware bar and to seek to retain jurisdiction over major
cases, see Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware'sStake in CorporateLaw, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 127-32 (2009).
* Cheffins, Armour & Black, supra note 6, at 436-39.
Id. at 437 (noting rate to be forty-eight percent).
't

Id.

12

The average number of securities class action filings between 1997

and 2004 was 231 per year.
SVETLANA STARYIG

&

See DR. JORDAN MILEV, ROBERT PATTON,

DR. JOHN MONTGOMERY,

SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:

RECENT TRENDS IN

2011 YEAR-END REVIEW 2 (2011),

available at http://www.nera.com/67_7557.htm. The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act was enacted in late 1995, and in 1996 the number of
cases fell to 133, but then slowly increased to 512 in 2001. Since that time
there has been a steady decline in "standard" securities class actions,
down to 128 in 2010 and 138 in 2011. Id. But special categories of cases
(such as "options backdating cases") have arisen to fill much of the gap. In
particular, NERA follows "M&A objection lawsuits," which have become
"the single largest category of non-standard cases tracked by NERA." Id.
at 1. There were sixty-eight such cases in 2010 and sixty-one in 2011. Id.
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general, litigiousness can be curbed. The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA") did chill securities class
actions,13 and the number of such actions has recently fallen
again, possibly as the result of a variety of legal
developments.14 Thus, if it wanted to, Delaware could easily
curb M&A litigation in Delaware by a variety of means, such
as by mandating presumptive sanctions or reducing fee
awards in unpromising cases that settle. Some Delaware
decisions appear to have moved in this direction.'" But
reducing fee awards increases the incentive for relatively
mobile plaintiffs' attorneys to sue outside of Delaware. Some
believe that the trend to suing in the state courts outside of
Delaware is at least in part a product of the relative
parsimony of the Delaware Court of Chancery in its fee
award jurisprudence.1 6 Thus the dilemma becomes apparent:
take action to cure one problem, and you exacerbate the
other! Discouraging litigation in Delaware (even nonmeritorious litigation) only increases the migration of cases
out of Delaware.
See id.
" Several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and tighter class
certification standards, may explain some of the decline in securities class
actions. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)
(limiting suits against foreign defendants); Stoneridge Inc. Partners LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (limiting suits against thirdparty advisers). These decisions have eliminated whole classes of cases
and defendants who previously were sued regularly. Tighter class
certification standards are also a factor. See Miles v. Merrill Lynch, 471
F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945-46
1
(Del. Ch. 2010) (replacing lead counsel and describing a pattern in M&A
litigation under which "No One Litigates Anything," but all seek to settle
early); In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(describing pattern of "hastily-filed, first-day complaints that serve no
purpose other than for a particular law firm and its clients to get into the
metal round of the speed filing (also formerly known as the lead counsel
selection) Olympics"). Obviously, the rhetoric here is not flattering.
16 This appears to be the view both of Professors Cheffins, Armour &
Black, see Cheffins, Armour & Black, supra note 6, at 492, and of William
Savitt. See William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System,
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570 (2012).
13
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Discussion at the Columbia Law School Symposium: The
Delaware Court of Chancery: Change and Continuity, both
on and off the record, focused more intensely on this topic
than on any other. Plaintiffs' attorneys grumbled about the
rhetoric of some decisions, and the case for and against
higher fee awards was vigorously debated. , A large fee
awarded in a much publicized Delaware case subsequent to
the Columbia Symposium has been read by some as a signal
that Delaware will award higher fees to attract litigation
back to Delaware." If such a policy were ever adopted,
however, it would offend many Delaware-incorporated firms
that would see it as an undesirable subsidy for litigation.
From an academic perspective, should we care about
Delaware's dilemma? Several reasons suggest we should. In
this Symposium, in a provocative article, William Savitt
argues that the Court of Chancery functions much like a
regulatory agency." Through the use of dicta, its decisions
in one case set standards for a range of future cases-much
as does guidance in an SEC release. Still, that role could be
eclipsed if the migration out of Delaware increases. Today,
he argues, the Court of Chancery "takes seriously its
obligation to safeguard the interests of the class"" and is "no
rubber stamp."2 0 But what will happen in the future if by
rejecting a weak, or potentially collusive, settlement, the
Court encourages plaintiffs to file elsewhere in order to
" Chancellor Strine awarded $285 million in attorney fees to two
plaintiffs' law firms. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Litig., 30 A.3d 60
(Del. Ch. 2011). The press and some blogs have read this as evidence that
Delaware is seeking to lure the plaintiffs bar back to Delaware. See Gina
Chon & Joe Palazzolo, An Early Christmasfor These Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 28, 2011, at Cl; see also Steven Davidoff, Year End Surprises in Deal
2011,
1:45pm),
(Dec.
21,
DEALBOOK,
N.Y.
TIMES
Law,

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/year-end-surprises-in-de al-law.
s See Savitt, supra note 16. Savitt recognizes that it is not necessary
for Delaware courts to hear every case (or even most) to play a lawmaking
role, so long as other courts respect, apply, and abide by Delaware law.
But competitive pressure may change the law if Delaware must please
plaintiff law firms to retain litigation.
'9 Id. at 582.
Id.

20
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obtain approval of a questionable settlement from a more
tolerant or more generous (or less sophisticated) court in
another jurisdiction?
The causes underlying this exodus out of Delaware are
debatable and were much debated at this Symposium.
Professor Black and his co-authors argue in their important
contribution to this Symposium that the migration from
Delaware is the product of a new level of competitiveness
within the plaintiffs' bar, caused at least in part by the
breakup of Milberg, Weiss, long the de facto dominant firm
in the field. 21 They could be right, and certainly they provide
the fullest recent account of developments within the
plaintiffs bar. Nonetheless, there may be other, simpler
explanations for the growing rate of stockholder litigation in
state courts, and Occam's Razor should oblige us to prefer
the simpler theory.
From that perspective, the key fact for the plaintiffs' bar
is that M&A litigation in state court appears fairly riskless.
M&A cases seem usually to settle. This may be attributed to
any of several related reasons. First, target management
(and the bidder as well) are under time pressure to close a
deal and may be risk averse. Second, the costs of settling
M&A litigation are very modest in terms of the transaction's
size. As a result, defendants may see this cost as simply a
"rounding error" in terms of the overall transaction costs,
small even in comparison to the fees to the investment
bankers or the corporate lawyers. Thus, corporate issuers
may pay a modest sum to ensure that the closing schedules
for their transactions are not disrupted. Hence, if it is
perceived that the defendant will always settle, it becomes
likely that the plaintiffs will almost always sue (and also
normally settle fairly cheaply).
But why has the rate of state court M&A litigation
recently soared? The Cheffins-Armour-Black hypothesis
explains that there are more such suits today because
competition within the plaintiffs bar causes every possible
suit to be brought by someone. But this explanation seems
"1 See Cheffins, Armour & Black, supra note 6.
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incomplete without some further consideration of why
defendants do not resist settlement. Here, the growing size
of M&A transactions over recent years may make the costs of
settlement seem increasingly modest and so reduce the
defendants' urge to resist.
Let's make some not unrealistic factual assumptions. If a
settlement can be achieved based only on increased
disclosure and the payment of attorneys' fees, it will likely
amount to less than one percent of a large (e.g., $1 billion or
more) transaction's total cost. If there is even a one percent
chance that the transaction might be delayed or enjoined by
the litigation, that payment will likely seem easily costjustified to the target management (which is not using its
own money in settling). Here, the migration out of Delaware
may increase the uncertainty that leads risk-averse
defendants to settle in M&A cases. Although litigation
outcomes can be predicted with relative accuracy when
litigation is brought in Delaware, this is less true in other
jurisdictions where the judges may have had little experience
with M&A litigation. Thus, one advantage to plaintiffs in
litigating before a state court outside of Delaware is that
defendants cannot as easily predict the outcome.22 The
bottom line is that uncertainty is desired by plaintiffs
because it encourages settlement, particularly when
defendants have much at risk.
Alternatively, a more troubling and less benign
explanation for multi-forum litigation is that if defendants
expect to be sued in multiple jurisdictions (as, realistically,
they must expect today), they may find it more useful to
settle than to win a litigated victory. This is because a
settlement can be designed to collaterally estop actions over
which the state court does not even have subject matter
jurisdiction. From the defendant's perspective, the release
given incident to the settlement can be structured so as to
22 Moreover, having never before seen a billion-dollar lawsuit or
litigation involving major public corporations that is attracting press
attention, the out-of-state judge may be fascinated with the case (as the
author has observed in some actual cases) and may be in no hurry to
resolve it.
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have the widest possible preclusive impact on other actions.23
At worst, this can lead to what I have elsewhere called the
"reverse auction," in which the defendants seek to settle with
the weakest plaintiffs because they will predictably settle for
The frequency of such "reverse
the lowest amount."
auctions" in this context is an uncertain empirical question
that need not be pursued further in this introduction. But it
suggests that deeper public policy issues lie beneath the
surface here; increased competition may only be part of the
story.
II. THE EXODUS FROM DELAWARE: HOW WILL IT
PLAY OUT?
Delaware has a problem, but not yet a crisis. Declining
market share would be a crisis if it were inducing firms to
incorporate elsewhere. There is no evidence that this is
happening, and no logical reason that it should, as corporate
issuers normally want the availability of a Delaware forum.
" To give but one illustration, if a case in Delaware is dismissed on
pleading grounds or because of a failure to make demand on the board (in
a derivative action), this outcome may not be seen by a court in a different
jurisdiction as a substantive holding that bars that court from reaching
the merits because of res judicata or collateral estoppel. In contrast, a
settlement can bar other actions, even those in federal court based on the
federal securities laws. See Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367 (1996) (settlement in state court must be given full faith and
credit, even though state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
federal securities claims that were released by the settlement). Hence it
may be more practical to settle than to fight in a world characterized by
multi-forum litigation. Also, it may be easier to secure a release of federal
claims in state court when they cannot be litigated there.
24 The author coined this term in the context of mass torts actions. It
now may characterize some forms of corporate litigation as well. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 392 (2000);

John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-73 (1995).

Several courts have

picked up this term. See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. & Guar. Nat'l Bank of
Tallahassee Second Mortg. Loan Litig., 418 F.3d 277, 308 (3d Cir. 2005);
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.).
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The problem is that the venue for litigation is traditionally
chosen by the plaintiffs.
This problem is not unique and has historical precedents.
Case flow has in the past rapidly shifted from one
jurisdiction to another. For example, it is widely believed
that the flow of derivative actions moved from New York to
Delaware when New York, in the 1940s, enacted a securityfor-expenses statute that required plaintiffs to post a bond to
cover defendants' reasonable expenses if their action was
unsuccessful.2 5 Delaware never enacted a similar statute, in
all likelihood because one of its leading local industries
corporate legal services-profited from the influx of cases.
This example shows a fundamental difference between the
two states: in New York, derivative actions were perceived as
"strike suits" brought against local corporations by
extortionate attorneys who needed to be discouraged; in
Delaware, the same actions were regarded as a valuable
business opportunity, which the state was happy to attract
(and even compete for).
A more recent example of case migration involves the
response of the securities class action bar to the passage of
the PSLRA in 1995. Almost immediately, plaintiff firms
began to file class actions in state court, often suing under
the state's "Blue Sky" statute, in order to escape the
heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA.2 6 Their rapid
adaptation was sufficiently effective that the same coalition
of business groups that had forced the passage of the PSLRA
over President Clinton's veto were forced to return to
Congress and secure the enactment of the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), which
largely precluded most securities-related fraud class actions
in state court.27
2s Justice Jacobs makes this same point in his contribution to this
Symposium. See Jacobs, supranote 1, at 406.
26 For a judicial recognition of this pattern, see Segal v. Fifth
Third
Bank, 581 F.3d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 2009).
27 SLUSA chiefly revised Section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933
to
preempt securities class actions in state court. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)
(2012). Ironically, Delaware had sufficient legislative clout to prevent
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Is the SLUSA precedent relevant here? Could Congress
conceivably act to restrict multi-forum litigation in order to
give a preference to the jurisdiction of incorporation? This
seems unlikely. First, Delaware is unlikely to seek federal
assistance (given its efforts to secure the "Delaware carveout" from SLUSA). Second, even though M&A litigation is a
virtual certainty today in major transactions, the scale of the
problem is much smaller than in the case of securities class
actions. Fewer companies are affected. 28 Third, it is open to
argument whether Delaware corporations truly want M&A
suits outside of Delaware precluded, as multiple forums may
enhance their ability to settle favorably with one of the
weaker teams of plaintiffs suing them.
Little consensus exists at present on what reforms are
optimal. Traditional liberals who are skeptical of Delaware
tend to fear any outcome that gives Delaware a greater role
because it will increase Delaware's hegemony over the other
states. Thus, they may favor letting plaintiffs go to the
jurisdiction of their choice in order to erode Delaware's lawmaking ability. Realists, however, will doubt the wisdom of
deferring to the plaintiffs choice of forum, because the
Some
plaintiffs own motives may be more suspect.
plaintiffs' attorneys may avoid Delaware because they
perceive they are not respected there. Some may believe
that they have a home court advantage in their own
jurisdiction. Some may want a jury trial, which is generally
not available in Delaware. Others may simply prefer to file
an action anywhere and wait for defendants to approach
them with a settlement offer.

Congress from also preempting Delaware-style fiduciary breach cases,
which were specifically exempted from SLUSA's coverage. This "Delaware
carve-out" was contained in Section 16(d)(1) of the Securities Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 77(p)(d). See also Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., 658 F.3d 549
(6th Cir. 2011) (discussing the scope of the "Delaware carve-out").
Essentially, the carve-out preserves "M&A objection" cases (in NERA's
terminology) that would otherwise be preempted by SLUSA. These cases
have recently increased. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
28 The number of "M&A objection" cases in 2010 and 2011 was sixtyeight and sixty-one, respectively. See supra note 12.
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From a public policy perspective, competition among
states for M&A "fiduciary breach" litigation may present the
clearest case in which competition does produce a "race to
the bottom."
Close students of M&A litigation have
recognized that such litigation often has a "phantom"
character.2 9 Plaintiffs rush to file, then fight intensely over
the appointment of lead counsel, but thereafter take little
discovery, conduct no depositions, and make few motions.
Arguably, they "file early, then free ride."30 This fits a more
general pattern than I have elsewhere described:
entrepreneurial litigation is high volume litigation conducted
on a portfolio-wide basis in which plaintiffs' attorneys tend to
economize on case-specific investment.3 ' This is logical
because plaintiffs' attorneys cannot safely predict which
cases will settle. Increased competition may only reinforce
this tendency to avoid substantial case-specific investment,
because the rival teams will realize that if they invest
significantly in an action, they may only cause the defendant
to settle the case more cheaply with others who had invested
less. The less one invests in the action, the more cheaply one
can settle it profitably.
Perhaps the most striking evidence that interstate
competition may be producing perverse results comes not
from the Cheffins, Armour & Black paper, but from a more
recent study by NERA researchers.3 2 It finds the same
increasing tendency for multiple actions to be filed in
29 For a description of this pattern in which "No One Litigates
Anything," see In re Revlon, Inc. S'holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945-46
(Del. Ch. 2010).

o See Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free
Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1797 (2004).
" See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 687-90, 711-12

(1986).
3 See DOUGLAS J. CLARK & MARCIA KRAMER MEYER, ANATOMY OF A
MERGER LITIGATION, NERA Economic Consulting (April 2012), available at

http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUBAnatomyMerger-Litigation-0312.
pdf.
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multiple jurisdictions, but also that "[t]he vast majority of
merger cases settle for disclosure as opposed to monetary
consideration, such as an increase in the deal price.""
Specifically, it finds that in only ten percent of the M&A
settlements that it surveyed did class members receive any
monetary consideration. 4
To sum up, the impact of the new fragmentation within
the plaintiffs bar is uncertain, but the rise of multi-forum,
litigation may coincide with an increased number of illusory
settlements that benefit only the plaintiffs' attorneys. If so,
what remedy could curb this possibility? One logical answer,
which has already been recommended by an important court
of chancery decision," would be for Delaware corporations to
insert forum selection clauses into their corporate charters.
These provisions would specify that the Delaware Court of
Chancery was the exclusive forum for the resolution of intraentity disputes."
Several commentators have agreed that such a provision
should be enforceable (at least in the case of a "plain vanilla"
provision approved by the shareholders)." Closer questions
3

Id. at 9.

Id. at 10. This figure was based on a sample of 162 settled litigation
deals.
" See In re Revlon, Inc. S'holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-61 (Del. Ch.
2010) (describing the proposed clause).
6 Exactly what is meant by "intra-entity disputes" involves subtler
questions of definition. Generally, these forum selection clauses would not
apply to Rule 10b-5 and other federal securities fraud claims (because
state law cannot supersede federal law), but would preclude the filing of a
derivative action or a "fiduciary breach" class action outside of Delaware.
For an example of such a "fiduciary breach" class action, see Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Gray areas do, however, arise because
Rule 10b-5 actions can be asserted derivatively. See Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977) (minority shareholders may assert claims
derivatively for the unfair issuance of shares by their company to a
controlling parent company). A prudently drafted forum selection clause
might wisely stop short of attempting to transfer such a claim to
Delaware, in part because state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
hear cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
37 For
fuller discussions, see Faith Stevelman, Regulatory
Competition, Choice of Forum and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34
3
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arise when the forum selection clause is either adopted by a
board-passed bylaw that is not ratified by shareholders or is
made to apply retroactively to pre-existing litigation. One
recent federal decision has rejected such an attempt," but
even that case recognized that the arguments for the
enforceability of a forum selection clause would be far
stronger if a majority of the shareholders had approved it."
Nonetheless, uncertainty lingers. Companies that have
adopted a forum selection charter amendment or bylaw have
recently been sued by shareholders seeking to invalidate
them.40 Plaintiffs in these cases appear to be relying on a
statement in Galaviz v. Berg, the recent federal decision
invalidating Oracle Corporation's board-passed forum
selection bylaw, that venue is a matter of federal common
law, thus calling into question whether any forum selection
clause could ever be enforced. Although the Galaviz decision
now hangs over this field like Banquo's ghost, its conclusion

DEL. J. CoRP. L. 57, 133-35 (2009) (evaluating arguments for and against
enforceability); Sara Lewis, Transfer the "Anywhere But Chancery"
Problem Into the "Nowhere But Chancery"Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 199 (2008) (answering the question whether non-Delaware courts

would enforce a forum selection clause contained in the bylaws or charter
of a Delaware corporation in the affirmative).
" See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
9 Id. at 1175.
40 For example, Chevron Corporation adopted a forum selection bylaw
and most recently modified it on March 12, 2012, which bylaw provides
that the Delaware Court of Chancery is the "sole and exclusive forum" for
derivative actions and certain other litigation alleging breaches of
fiduciary duties by its officers and directors. See Chevron Corp., Report of
Unscheduled Material Events or Corporate Event (Form 8-K) (Mar. 29,
2012). A lawsuit challenging this bylaw is currently pending in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. See
Bushansky v. Armacoast, No. 4:12-cv-01597 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012). For
another example, see Verified Complaint, Boilermakers Local 154
Retirement Fund v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 7219 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6,
2012).
4'
Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 ("Even assuming, however, that
the directors had the power to adopt a bylaw of this nature in the abstract,
the enforceability of a purported venue requirement is a matter of federal
common law.").
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that forum selection is governed by federal common law
seems overbroad on a variety of grounds.4 2
Nonetheless, the clearest answer to the Galaviz court's
doubts about the enforceability of a forum selection clause
would be for Delaware to enact a statutory amendment
expressly authorizing forum selection clauses. The impact of
such an amendment would be to trigger the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp.4 3 that the substantive corporate governance policies of
a state must be respected in federal court, even though they
are expressed in procedural terms. Cohen involved a New
Jersey security-for-expenses statute that required plaintiffs
to post such a bond in a derivative suit. Plaintiffs sought to
claim that federal procedural rules (which did not require
such a bond) applied in federal court, but lost because the
Court recognized that important state policies on corporate
governance needed to be respected. Since that time, the
" Galaviz does not adequately distinguish MIS Bremen v. Zapata's
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which upheld a forum selection under
federal common law. Nor does it address the Court's decision in Steward
Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), in which several
justices favored granting great deference to such a clause.
4 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949). A brief word is necessary here about
the possible impact of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). In this recent case, which involved
a conflict between Rule 23 and a New York state statute limiting class
actions to recover a "penalty," the plurality ruled in favor of Rule 23 and
refused to enforce the New York state statute. However, the concurring
opinion of Justice Stevens and the four dissenting justices agreed that
courts needed to balance state substantive policies with federal procedural
rules. Here, such balancing is particularly appropriate, given the statederived nature of corporate law. In any event, no direct conflict with a
federal procedural rule is involved in the case of a forum selection clause,
and federal common law should normally seek to respect important state
policies. See Steward Organization,Inc., 487 U.S. 22. Finally, one can
read federal statutes authorizing suits to be filed in federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction as consistent with giving effect to forum selection
clauses by allowing the action to be filed in federal court, but then
enforcing the forum selection clause. Under this reading, the action could
be filed, but the federal court would refer those state claims covered by the
clause to the Delaware court and would stay the action pending such
resolution.
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Court has repeatedly emphasized that corporations are
creatures of state law."
Presumably, if it wanted to,
Delaware could simply abolish the derivative action or make
on extremely rigorous
its availability dependent
preconditions." In this light, a forum selection clause is a far
more modest incursion on shareholders rights and is as
much a substantive policy as the security-for-example bond
in Cohen.
At present, corporations seem to be holding back from
adopting forum selection clauses, at least by means of a
shareholder vote.46 Four explanations for their caution seem
plausible: (1) legal uncertainty deters some issuers,
particularly in view of pending litigation; (2) for other
issuers, apathy still reigns, as the prospect of M&A litigation
is not sufficiently material to them to justify an advance
response; (3) more corporations appear to fear that proxy
advisors will resist such a proposed charter amendment and
cause institutional investors to vote it down; and (4) some
corporations may actually want multi-forum litigation
because it reduces the likely settlement they will have to pay
in the event of a future M&A transactions in which they are
the target.
The case for a statutory amendment authorizing the use
of forum selection charter provisions comes into clearer focus
if we examine the last occasion on which Delaware did
something similar. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court
decided Smith v. Van Gorkom4' and held outside directors
liable for their breach of the duty of care in an M&A
transaction in which their company was sold at a substantial

" These cases begin with Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
'

Indeed, Cohen v. Beneficial IndustriesLoan Corp. more or less says

this, holding that restrictive legislation limiting derivative actions does
not violate due process or deny equal protection. See Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550-53 (1949).
' Prominent M&A lawyers advise the author that they are inserting
such clauses into IPOs and spinoffs where no shareholder vote is required,
but are otherwise awaiting the outcome of pending litigation.
' 488 A.2d 858 (1985).

402

COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 20 12_

premium. Although the decision can certainly be defended,
Corporate America was shocked. The intensity of the
reaction was compounded by a cyclical crisis in "D&O"
insurance market that led some insurers to cancel their D&O
insurance policies for directors, and some directors resigned
from their boards. Feeling that it had to act, Delaware
borrowed an idea from the Principles of Corporate
Governance Project of the American Law Institute ("ALI").
As part of the ALI's efforts to prepare a "Restatement-like"
codification of fiduciary duties and best corporate governance
practices, the ALI's Reporters had just recommended that
corporate statutory law authorize charter amendments
reducing the liability of directors for duty of care violations
that were unaccompanied by illegality or self-dealing."
Seeing the merit in this idea but going slightly further than
the ALI, Delaware enacted Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, which expressly authorized
charter amendments exculpating directors of Delaware
companies from monetary liability for duty of care
violations. 9 The idea was an instant success: other states
followed Delaware (or, in some case, the earlier ALI
proposal), and the vast majority of public corporations
Institutional
adopted similar charter amendments.
the
amendments
and
the
idea,
supported
investors happily
went through smoothly and without protest. Today, it would
be rare to find a public corporation, wherever incorporated,
without such a charter provision.

a This provision is today contained in Section 7.19 ("Limitation on
Damages in Case of Certain Breaches of the Duty of Care") of the
American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (A.L.I. 1992). The author served as

Reporter to the American Law Institute for Litigation Remedies in
connection with the preparation of the ALI Principles and is personally
familiar with the Delaware Bar Committee's reliance on it in adopting
Section 102(b)(7). Originally, Section 7.19 was numbered Section 7.17.
9 The author has discussed the debate over the ALI provision and
Section 102(b)(7) elsewhere. See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out,
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the Special Case of
Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988).
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Suppose Delaware did add a new Section 102(b)(8) to its
General Corporation Law to authorize forum selection
clauses that were approved by a shareholder vote. Would
corporations propose such clauses to their shareholders if
Delaware made them explicitly available? Although the
authority to adopt such a clause already exists,"o Delaware
has not officially endorsed such a clause as a matter of public
policy.
Such an explicit endorsement by a statutory
provision expressly authorizing such a clause should trigger
the earlier discussed rule in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.," because such a clause or bylaw would be

implementing a substantive policy of Delaware. Also, no
company would be the "test case" because many would be
adopting it at the same time. Nonetheless, there remains
the question of whether proxy advisors-most notably,
Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS")-would support
such a proposal.52 The author's prediction would be that
proxy advisors would be more hesitant to oppose a proposal
that was supported by the public policy of Delaware.
The final barrier could be that some corporations will
want to preserve the possibility of conducting a "reverse
auction." That assumes, however, that corporations perceive
the need for such a tactic well before any merger, "going
private," or leveraged buyout transaction surfaces with them

General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(1) already
50 Delaware
authorizes "[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating,
defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the
directors and the stockholders ... if such provisions are not contrary to the

laws of this state" (emphasis added). The legal issue is not whether
Delaware law authorizes such a charter provision, but whether it would
conflict in some fashion with federal law. See supra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text.
* See supranotes 42-44 and accompanying text.

The author is advised by counsel active in this area that
Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest of the proxy advisors, takes
a "case by case" approach as to whether it will recommend that
shareholders vote in favor of a forum selection clause (whether in bylaws
or in a charter provision). Glass Lewis & Co., the next largest proxy
advisor, has been more skeptical and does not support them.
5
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as the target corporation. Some corporations may think this
far in advance, but their number is probably modest."
Of course Delaware could go further and actually
mandate by statute a Delaware forum for intra-entity
disputes, thus eliminating the need for a shareholder vote.
Although this would eliminate the need for proxy advisor
support, such a move would be uncharacteristic of Delaware.
Delaware believes in an "enabling" body of corporate law
that maximizes shareholder choice. 4 Thus, offering (but not
requiring) a forum selection clause seems more consistent
with their basic approach.
III. CONCLUSION
The impact of competition among the states has probably
been the most debated topic in corporate law over the last
forty years." But the migration of cases out of Delaware
raises that issue in a new light. Increased competition
favors those for whose business the states are competing.
"Law and economics" scholars have long favored a
competitive market for corporate charters, believing that
competition benefits shareholders." Other equally eminent
scholars are unconvinced, believing that such competition
Correspondingly when the
largely benefits managers. 7
' Those corporations seeking to benefit from a reverse auction may
instead prefer a different type of forum selection clause that allows them
to decide after the litigation is commenced whether to seek a remand of
the action to Delaware. Such a dubious clause would effectively invite
plaintiffs in non-Delaware forums to offer (either implicitly or explicitly) to
settle cheap.
" This theme is most fully expressed in Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75
(Del. 1992).
" The modern debate over the "race to the bottom" begins with Bill
Cary's 1974 claim that Delaware had lead a "race to the bottom." See
Cary, supra note 2. For the earliest statement of this view, see Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part).
6 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
(1993).
" For a representative statement of this rival view, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
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motive is to attract or retain corporate litigation, the likely
beneficiaries of increased state competition will be the
plaintiffs' bar. This happened in the past when Delaware
declined to adopt a securities-for-expense statute. Delaware
thereby won litigation, but exposed corporate officials to a
marginally greater litigation risk.
Although other states are not yet actively competing for
Delaware's litigation business (and indeed are unlikely to
try),8 plaintiffs' attorneys can seek to exploit the potential
for such competition to extract benefits from Delaware in the
form of higher fee awards and relaxed standards. Once
again, academics will be able to debate whether competition
produces a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top." The
irony is that the sides in this debate are now switching.
Although the "race to the bottom" was an argument long
made by liberals, in this revised context, it becomes more an
argument to be made by corporate counsel, who want to
restrict such competition over lawsuits.
Delaware may believe in charter competition, but sees
problems in a competition for lawsuits.
On balance,
Delaware would be well advised to enact a policy favoring
such clauses by amending Section 102(b) of its General
Corporation Law expressly to authorize them. It is the
simplest, cleanest answer to many of the problems discussed
in this Symposium.

Reconsidering the Competition Over CorporateCharters, 112 YALE L.J. 553
(2002).
' The volume of such litigation is simply too small to have any impact
on other states. In reality, this is the same reason that leads many
scholars to doubt that other states care much about corporate franchise
revenues or are actively competing with Delaware in the market for
corporate characters. See id.

